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Abstract. In this paper, we study online double auctions, where multi-
ple sellers and multiple buyers arrive and depart dynamically to exchange
one commodity. We show that there is no deterministic online double
auction that is truthful and competitive for maximising social welfare in
an adversarial model. However, given the prior information that sellers
are patient and the demand is not more than the supply, a deterministic
and truthful greedy mechanism is actually 2-competitive, i.e. it guaran-
tees that the social welfare of its allocation is at least half of the optimal
one achievable offline. Moreover, if the number of incoming buyers is pre-
dictable, we demonstrate that an online double auction can be reduced
to an online one-sided auction, and the truthfulness and competitiveness
of the reduced online double auction follow that of the online one-sided
auction. Notably, by using the reduction, we find a truthful mechanism
that is almost 1-competitive, when buyers arrive randomly. Finally, we
argue that these mechanisms also have a promising applicability in more
general settings without assuming that sellers are patient, by decompos-
ing a market into multiple sub-markets.
Keywords: Online auctions, double auctions, online bipartite match-
ing, mechanism design
1 Introduction
Double auction markets (aka exchanges) allow multiple sellers and multiple buy-
ers to trade a commodity simultaneously, e.g. the New York Stock Exchange.
Each trader (seller or buyer) has a private valuation of the commodity. In a
double auction market, sellers submit asks (sell orders) to sell a commodity
and buyers submit bids (buy orders) to buy the commodity. We assume that
each trader supplies/demands one unit of the commodity. Given asks and bids
submitted by traders, the market owner (aka auctioneer) matches them using
certain market clearing polices in order to make transactions. Traditionally, dou-
ble auctions have been well studied in static settings, where all traders are known
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before the auctioneer makes any decision [1,2,3]. However, in most modern dou-
ble auction markets, traders arrive and depart at different times. We call these
markets online double auctions. The main challenge for the auctioneer in an on-
line double auction is to make decisions without knowing the traders/orders not
yet arrived. The decisions involve an online bipartite matching (i.e. allocation)
between sellers and buyers and a payment calculation.
Following the previous work in online auction design [4,5,6], this article makes
an incremental step in this field. We focus on two important criteria, truthfulness
and efficiency, for online double auction design. We say a mechanism is truthful
if for each trader, reporting his truthful type, including valuation, arrival and
departure time, is his dominant strategy, and it is efficient if the social welfare
of its allocation is maximised among all feasible allocations.
1.1 Contributions
We show that there is no deterministic and truthful online double auction that is
also competitive for efficiency in an adversarial model. Then we further study the
environment where sellers are relatively static compared with buyers. Within this
environment, two situations are examined: 1) the demand (the number of buyers)
is not more than the supply (the number of sellers), but not known exactly, 2)
the demand is predictable but not necessarily not more than the supply. We
show that, in the first situation, a deterministic and truthful greedy-mechanism
is actually 2-competitive. In the second situation, we propose a framework to
reduce a truthful online double auction to a truthful online one-sided auction,
and demonstrate that the competitiveness of the reduced online double auction
follows that of the online one-sided auction. Especially, by using the reduction,
we achieve a truthful auction that is almost 1-competitive, i.e. the social welfare
of the auction’s allocation is nearly optimised, when buyers arrive randomly.
Finally, we show that the assumption made on sellers’ arrival and departure
can be relaxed by, for example, decomposing a market into multiple disjoint
sub-markets and applying the proposed mechanisms in each sub-market.
1.2 Related Work
During last decade, there have been substantial researches on mechanism de-
sign in different dynamic environments, termed online mechanism design (see
[6] for a survey). Most of the previous work has focused on one-sided dynamic
markets where either the supply or the demand is dynamic, e.g. Ad auctions [7].
More importantly, the auctioneer (in most cases, the seller) in one-sided dynamic
markets does not provide valuations (or reserve prices) to the commodities ex-
changed and is not considered to strategically manipulate the auction. However,
in online double auction markets, both the supply and the demand are dynamic
and playing strategically, and the auctioneer has no control of any of them.
To tackle the complexity of online double auction design, existing research
has utilised certain accessible prior knowledge of the dynamics to design desirable
online auctions [4,5]. For instance, given the assumption that the valuations of
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traders are in a range [pmin, pmax], Blum et al. [4] proposed a r-competitive
truthful online double auction in an adversarial setting for maximising social
welfare, where r is the fixed point of r = 12 ln
pmax−pmin
(r−1)pmin . Besides that, they also
considered many other criteria. Moreover, assumed that traders’ available/active
time period in the auction is no more than some constant K, Bredin et al. [5]
designed a framework to construct truthful online double auctions from truthful
static double auctions, and demonstrated the performance (for maximising social
welfare) of the auctions given by the framework in probabilistic settings through
experiments.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce our mar-
ket model and related concepts. In Section 3, we show the impossibility result.
Then we propose a deterministic and truthful mechanism that is 2-competitive
in Section 4 and a framework to reduce a truthful online double auction to a
truthful online one-sided auction in Section 5 for two restricted environments
respectively. We conclude in Section 6 with some discussions.
2 Preliminaries and Notations
We consider an online/dynamic double auction market, in which a set B of
buyers and a set S of sellers trade one commodity. Buyers and sellers are
traders. We will refer to a seller as she and a buyer or trader as he. Let T = B∪S
and assume that traders are independent and no trader can be both buyer and
seller at the same time, i.e. B ∩S = ∅. Each trader supplies or demands a single
unit of the commodity during a specific time period called the active time of the
trader. Since each trader might have different active times, they might come and
leave the market at different times, which causes the dynamics of the market.
Given the dynamics of the market, the auctioneer (market owner) is challenged
by making decisions without knowing those traders not yet arrived.
Each trader i ∈ T has a privately observed type θi = (vi, ai, di), where
vi, ai, di ∈ R+, vi is i’s valuation of a single unit of the commodity, and ai and
di are the starting point and the ending point of i’s active time, i.e. the arrival
and departure time of i.
Due to the revelation principle [8], we focus on mechanisms that require
traders to directly report their types. However, traders do not necessarily re-
port their true types but no early-arrival and no late-departure misreports are
permitted, i.e. given trader i’s type θi = (vi, ai, di), his report θ
′
i = (v
′
i, a
′
i, d
′
i)
satisfies a′i ≤ d′i and [a′i, d′i] ⊆ [ai, di]. The intuition behind this constraint is
that traders do not recognise the market before their arrival and they do not get
utility for any trade happened after their true departure. We say a seller’s report
(called ask) θi = (vi, ai, di) and a buyer’s report (called bid) θj = (vj , aj , dj)
are matchable if and only if vi ≤ vj and [ai, di] ∩ [aj , dj ] 6= ∅. That is, a
match/transaction should not decrease social welfare.
Let θ = (θi)i∈T denote a complete type profile, and θA = (θi)i∈S and θB =
(θi)i∈B be the complete ask and bid profile respectively. Let θ−i be the type
profile of all traders except for i.
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Definition 1. An online double auction (ODA) M = (pi, x) consists of
an allocation policy pi = (pii)i∈T and a payment policy x = (xi)i∈T , where
pii(θ) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not trader i trades successfully during his
reported active time (1 means success), and xi(θ) ∈ R+ determines the payment
paid (received) by buyer (seller) i during his (her) reported active time.
An allocation pi is feasible if
∑
i∈B pii(θ) =
∑
i∈S pii(θ) for all B, S and θ.
An ODA M = (pi, x) is feasible if pi is feasible. Feasibility guarantees that the
auctioneer never takes short or long position in the commodity exchanged in the
market. Only feasible ODAs will be discussed in this article.
Given trader i of type θi = (vi, ai, di), report profile θ
′ and ODAM = (pi, x),
let v(θi) = vi, and the utility of i is defined as
u(θi, θ
′, (pi, x)) =
{
v(θi)pii(θ
′)− xi(θ′), if i ∈ B.
xi(θ
′)− v(θi)pii(θ′), if i ∈ S.
Definition 2. An ODA M = (pi, x) is truthful (aka incentive-compatible)
if u(θi, (θi, θ
′
−i), (pi, x)) ≥ u(θi, θ′, (pi, x)) for all i, all permitted misreports θ′ of
θ, all type profile θ.
Definition 3. An ODA M = (pi, x) is efficient if M maximises the social
welfare
W (pi(θ)) =
∑
i∈B
v(θi) · pii(θ) +
∑
i∈S
v(θi) · (1 − pii(θ)) (1)
for all type profile θ.
In other words, an ODA is efficient if it always allocates items to those traders
who value them most highly. In a market with dynamic participants, it is often
not possible for an online mechanism to guarantee efficient allocations with-
out the knowledge of the dynamics, because the mechanism’s decision-making
is challenged by the uncertainty of future participants. Therefore, we measure
an online mechanism’s efficiency by competitive analysis, namely, we compare
the social welfare obtained by an online mechanism with the maximal social
welfare one can achieve offline, i.e. when the mechanism knows all future coming
reports. Given type profile θ, let Opt(θ) be the optimal allocation giving the
optimal/maximal social welfare. Note that Opt(θ) is also constrained by feasibil-
ity. The following notion of competitiveness will be used to measure the efficiency
of ODAs.
Definition 4. An ODA M = (pi, x) is c-competitive if for any type profile θ,
the social welfare of pi(θ)W (pi(θ)) ≥ W (Opt(θ))
c
. We refer to c as the competitive
ratio of M for efficiency. We say that M is competitive if M is c-competitive
for some constant c > 0.
Moreover, we say a mechanism is individually rational if it gives its partic-
ipants non-negative utility, i.e. they are not forced to participate, and a mecha-
nism is budget balanced if the mechanism receives zero profit or weakly budget
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balanced if its profit is non-negative. All the mechanisms discussed in the rest
are individually rational without further mention.
Note that the mechanism we defined in the above are deterministic. Non-
deterministic mechanisms are also proposed/discussed in the rest, and they can
be represented as a probabilistic combination of deterministic ones.
3 No Deterministic ODA is Universally Competitive
In this section, we will demonstrate that no deterministic and truthful ODA is
competitive in an adversarial model. That is, for any deterministic and truthful
ODA M = (pi, x), there exists a type profile θ such that the social welfare
W (pi(θ)) is infinitely far from the optimal one W (Opt(θ)).
Theorem 1. For any deterministic and truthful ODA M = (pi, x) and any
c > 0, there exists a type profile θ such that W (pi(θ)) ≤ W (Opt(θ))
c
.
Proof. A deterministic ODA makes decisions at a bid’s/ask’s arrival time, de-
parture time and/or predefined time points.
If decisions are not only made at asks’ departure time, then we can always find
a type profile θ′ such that the last arrived ask θlast of θ′ is matched byM before
θlast departs. Let θ = (θ
′, θ∗) where θ∗ = (v∗, a∗, d∗) is a bid and it arrives after
θlast is matched and before θlast departs. Since M’s decision does not depend
on traders not yet arrived, θ∗ will not be matched by pi(θ) because there is no
unmatched ask available. There exists a θ∗ such that θ∗ is matched by Opt(θ) (if
v(θ∗) is sufficiently large) and W (pi(θ)) ≤ v(θ∗)c ≤ W (Opt(θ))c . Therefore, if v(θ∗)
approaches to ∞, c will also approach to ∞.
Otherwise, i.e. decisions are only made at asks’ departure time, there exists
a type profile θ where the last arrived bid θ∗ = (v∗, a∗, d∗) arrives after the
second last ask’s departure, and departs after the last ask’s arrival but before
the last ask’s departure, where we also get W (pi(θ)) ≤ v(θ∗)
c
≤ W (Opt(θ))
c
if v(θ∗)
is sufficiently large. Note that truthfulness is necessary to guarantee that all
types are truthfully reported so that social welfare is correctly measured. ⊓⊔
Given the above impossibility, we can still search for non-deterministic and
competitive mechanisms or examine cases where the dynamics is limited by, say,
certain prior knowledge of the future participants. For instance, we may know
the total number of traders arriving in the future, or traders’ valuation satisfying
some known distributions. With certain prior knowledge of the traders, ODAs
with desirable properties are achievable, e.g. [4,5].
In the rest of this paper, we further study two environments with prior in-
formation. In both cases, we assume that sellers are patient, i.e. they are active
before the first buyer’s arrival until the arrival of the last buyer. In the first case,
we further assume that the demand is no more than the supply, while in the
other case we assume that we know how many buyers will arrive. Although sell-
ers are relatively static in these online double auctions, they are not as same as
online one-sided auctions, even those considering reserve prices, because not only
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buyers but also sellers are playing strategically in double auctions. Moreover, we
will show in the conclusion how this assumption can be relaxed.
4 A Deterministic & Competitive Online Double Auction
Although we just showed that in general deterministic mechanism is not com-
petitive, in this section we demonstrate that a simple deterministic mechanism,
calledMgreedy , is actually 2-competitive, given that the demand (i.e. the number
of buyers) is not more than the supply (i.e. the number of sellers).
4.1 Specification of Mgreedy
The allocation policy, called Best-first (Bf) Allocation, of the deterministic ODA
Mgreedy greedily matches a newly arrived bid to the best unmatched ask, if they
are matchable, until there is no unmatched ask left or all bids have arrived.
The Allocation Policy of Mgreedy
– Rank all asks θA in ascending order of their valuations (breaking ties
randomly).
Upon arrival of bid θBi :
– If the unmatched ask θAj with the highest ranking position is matchable
with θBi , match θ
B
i with θ
A
j . Otherwise, θ
B
i is unmatched.
Figure 1a shows an example of the greedy allocation, where dots indicate
asks and bids, the value beside each dot represents the valuation of the ask/bid,
and the order of the bids is their arrival order (from top to bottom). There is
a line between an ask and a bid if they are matched by the allocation. Before
we describe the payment policy of Mgreedy, let us first introduce a notion of
reachability used in the payment policy.
Let ((θA
∗
1 , θ
B∗
1 ), (θ
A∗
2 , θ
B∗
2 ), ...) be the sequence of ask-bid pairs that are matched
by the greedy allocation in bid’s arrival order, e.g. ((2, 7), (3, 4), (5, 6)) in the
example shown in Figure 1, we say that two matched pairs (θA
∗
i , θ
B∗
i ) and
(θA
∗
j , θ
B∗
j ), where i ≤ j, are reachable from each other, if for all i ≤ m < j, bid
θB
∗
m and ask θ
A∗
m+1 are matchable. For the example shown in Figure 1, (2, 7) and
(3, 4) are reachable from each other, but (5, 6) is not reachable from (2, 7) and
(3, 4) because ask of valuation 5 and bid of valuation 4 are not matchable.
The payment policy is described in the following, which shows a way to
calculate the VCG payment (aka critical value [6]). Each matched buyer pays
the amount equal to the valuation of the seller to whom he is matched, which
is the infimum of all possible reported valuations for him to be matched in the
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(a) Best-first (b) Reachability
Asks Bids
2
3
5
8
9
10
1
3
2
6
4
7
(5)
(5)
(6)
(2)
(3)
(5)
(c) Payments
Fig. 1: A Running Example of Mgreedy
auction, while each matched seller receives the supremum of all payments she
can ask to get matched. There is no payment for unmatched traders, i.e. the
mechanism is individually rational.
The Payment Policy of Mgreedy
For each matched seller i with type θi:
xi(θ) =
{
min(v(θ¯Amin),max(v(θ
B
last), v(θ¯
B
max))), if θ
B
last is reachable from θi
max(v(θAlast), v(θ¯
B
max)), otherwise
where
– θAlast is the last matched ask, and θ
B
last is the last matched bid,
– θ¯Amin is the unmatched ask with the lowest valuation (v(θ¯
A
min) = ∞ if
θ¯Amin does not exist),
– θ¯Bmax is the unmatched bid with the highest valuation (v(θ¯
B
max) = 0 if
θ¯Bmax does not exist).
For each matched buyer j with type θj:
xj(θ) = v(m(θj)), where m(θj) is the ask matched to θj .
Example in Figure 1c shows the payments beside matched asks and bids
according to the above payment rule. In this example, v(θ¯Amin) is 8, v(θ
A
last) is 5,
v(θ¯Bmax) is 3 and v(θ
B
last) is 6. It is easy to see thatMgreedy is running a deficit in
this example. In other words, Mgreedy is not budget balanced, which is another
important criterion that we cannot achieve at the same time in this work.
4.2 Properties of Mgreedy
In the following, we prove that deterministic auction Mgreedy is truthful and
2-competitive.
Theorem 2. Mgreedy is truthful.
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Instead of proving that the allocation is monotonic and that the payment is
a kind of critical value [6], we demonstrate it in a more intuitive manner and the
proof is given in the Appendix.
To check the efficiency of Mgreedy , we will apply competitive analysis, a
method invented for analysing online algorithms. In other words, we will deter-
mine a competitive ratio c, defined in Definition 4, for Mgreedy.
To that end, given a report profile θ, we need to first know what is the
optimal allocation, i.e. an allocation maximising social welfare, if we are aware
of all future inputs/reports in advance. In this case, the optimal allocation is
achieved by matching the highest bid (with respect to valuation) with the lowest
ask, the second highest bid with the second lowest ask and so on, until there is
no more matchable pair left. It is easy to check that all asks that are matched
by the optimal allocation are also matched by Best-first Allocation.
Lemma 1. All asks that are matched by the optimal allocation are also matched
by Best-first Allocation.
AOpt
A¯Opt
BOpt
B¯Opt
BBf
(a) Special Case
AOpt
A¯Opt
BOpt
B¯Opt
BA
BA¯
B
′
B¯AA¯B
(b) General Case
Fig. 2: Best-first Allocation of Mgreedy
Theorem 3. Mgreedy is 2-competitive.
Proof. We first show that this competitive ratio is achievable under a special
case, and then we prove that in any other cases the ratio is also achievable.
The special case is that all matched asks of the optimal allocation are matched
to unmatched bids of the optimal allocation by Best-first Allocation, and un-
matched asks of the optimal allocation are also not matched by Best-first Allo-
cation (see Figure 2a for example, where the coloured areas are the asks and bids
matched by Best-first Allocation and double-sided arrows indicate the matching
relation). Let AOpt and A¯Opt be the matched and unmatched asks respectively
in the optimal allocation, and BOpt and BBf be the matched bids in the opti-
mal allocation and Best-first Allocation respectively and B¯Opt and B¯Bf be the
corresponding unmatched bids. We can get that BOpt ∩ BBf = ∅, i.e. no bid
from BOpt can be matched to any ask from A¯Opt. We also know that A¯Opt 6= ∅
Truthful and Competitive Online Double Auctions 9
and |A¯Opt| ≥ |BOpt| because we assumed that the demand is not more than the
supply. Therefore, ∑
θi∈A¯Opt
v(θi) >
∑
θi∈BOpt
v(θi). (2)
The social welfare of the optimal allocation is:
W (Opt(θ)) =
∑
θi∈A¯Opt
v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BOpt
v(θi). (3)
The social welfare of Best-first Allocation is:
W (Bf(θ)) =
∑
θi∈A¯Opt
v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BBf
v(θi). (4)
Combining (2), (3) and (4), we get
W (Bf(θ))
W (Opt(θ))
>
∑
θi∈A¯Opt v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BBf v(θi)∑
θi∈A¯Opt v(θi) +
∑
θi∈A¯Opt v(θi)
>
1
2
.
So far, we have proved the theorem in a special case. In general case, some
asks of AOpt might be matched to some bids of BOpt, and some asks of A¯Opt
might be matched to some bids ofBOpt by Best-first Allocation. Due to Lemma 1,
we know that all asks in AOpt are matched by Best-first Allocation. Let BA and
B¯A be all the bids from BOpt and B¯Opt respectively that are matched to asks of
AOpt by Best-first Allocation. Let A¯B be the asks from A¯Opt that are matched
to some bids of BOpt by Best-first Allocation, and BA¯ be the corresponding bids
matched to A¯Opt. Let B
′ = BOpt \ (BA∪BA¯) be the asks from BOpt that are not
matched by Best-first Allocation (see Figure 2b). Therefore, the social welfare
of Best-first Allocation is:
W (Bf(θ)) =
∑
θi∈A¯Opt\A¯B
v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BA∪B¯A∪BA¯
v(θi).
So, we get
W (Bf(θ))
W (Opt(θ))
=
∑
θi∈A¯Opt\A¯B v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BA∪B¯A∪BA¯ v(θi)∑
θi∈A¯Opt v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BOpt v(θi)
=
∑
θi∈A¯Opt∪BOpt v(θi)−Σ∑
θi∈A¯Opt∪BOpt v(θi)
= 1− Σ∑
θi∈A¯Opt∪BOpt v(θi)
, (5)
where Σ =
∑
θi∈B′∪A¯B v(θi)−
∑
θi∈B¯A v(θi).
Since the number of bids is not more than that of asks, i.e. the number of
unmatched bids is not more than that of unmatched asks, we get |A¯Opt \ A¯B| >
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|B′|. We know that no ask from A¯Opt \ A¯B can be matched to any bid in B′,
so
∑
θi∈A¯Opt\A¯B v(θi) ≥
∑
θi∈B′ v(θi), i.e.
∑
θi∈A¯Opt v(θi) ≥
∑
θi∈B′∪A¯B v(θi).
Thus,
Σ∑
θi∈A¯Opt∪BOpt v(θi)
≤ Σ∑
θi∈B′∪A¯B v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BOpt v(θi)
. (6)
Since∑
θi∈BOpt
v(θi) =
∑
θi∈BA¯∪BA∪B′
v(θi) ≥
∑
θi∈A¯B∪BA∪B′
v(θi) ≥
∑
θi∈A¯B∪B′
v(θi),
we conclude that
Σ∑
θi∈B′∪A¯B v(θi) +
∑
θi∈BOpt v(θi)
≤
Σ∑
θi∈B′∪A¯B v(θi) +
∑
θi∈A¯B∪B′ v(θi)
≤
Σ +
∑
θi∈B¯A v(θi)∑
θi∈B′∪A¯B v(θi) +
∑
θi∈A¯B∪B′ v(θi)
=
1
2
. (7)
Combining (5), (6) and (7), we get W (Bf(θ))
W (Opt(θ)) ≥ 12 . ⊓⊔
5 Reducing Double Auctions to One-sided Auctions
In this section, we study another case where we can predict how many buyers will
arrive. Given this prior information, we propose a reduction framework which
reduces an ODA to an online one-sided auction that aims to select the k-best
bids from n bids arriving in an online fashion, e.g. secretary-problem-based online
auctions [9,10,11].
The main difference between ODAs and online one-sided auctions is that,
instead of allocating k items to n agents in a one-sided auction, we do not
know how many items we should allocate to buyers in ODAs, because items
are provided by sellers which are unpredictable. Moreover, it is not efficient to
allocate an item from a seller with a high valuation to a buyer with a lower
valuation. For instance, in a double auction with only one seller, the auctioneer
does not just select any buyer but the one with a valuation at least better than
the seller’s. Since the goal of an efficient double auction is to allocate items to
traders with higher valuations, we can actually treat sellers as additional buyers
and apply efficient one-sided auction. In the rest of this section, we will show
how to consider sellers as additional buyers to design truthful and competitive
ODAs by applying truthful and competitive online one-sided auctions.
5.1 The Reduction
Let nA and nB be the number of asks θA and bids θB respectively. Let A be
an online one-sided auction. We construct an ODA MA from A as follows. The
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intuition is considering sellers as additional buyers by giving asks opportunity to
compete with bids in order to gain items back for sellers, if sellers’ valuations are
comparatively high among the valuations of both sellers and buyers. By doing
this, a seller with a comparatively high valuation will have a comparatively high
chance to get her item back if maximising social welfare is an objective of A.
In order to treat relatively static sellers as buyers, we assign them a new online
arrival order which is consistent with the arrival of buyers.
Online Double Auction MA based on Online One-sided Auction A
1. Choose a position li ∈ [1, nA + nB] for each ask θi according to a dis-
crete probability distribution function f(x) that satisfies the assump-
tions made on the arrival order of buyers.
2. Run A on the inputs that contain both asks θA and bids θB where each
ask θi arrives right after the (li − 1)-th input arrived.
3. If a bid θi is selected by A with payment pi and v(θi) ≥ v(θj), where
θj is the currently unmatched ask with lowest valuation (breaking ties
randomly), then θi is matched to θj with payment
xi(θ) = max(pi, v(θj)). (8)
Otherwise, θi is unmatched.
4. Once the matching/allocation is done, the payment for each matched
ask θj is as same as the one defined in Mgreedy , except that the bids
considered in the payment here are those selected by A only.
For the probability distribution function f(x) of MA, we only require that
f(x) satisfies the assumptions made on the arrival order of the inputs of A. In
other words, the arrival order assigned to asks satisfies the assumptions made
on the arrival order of bids. For instance, if A is based on a random-ordering
model, e.g. secretary-problem-based online auctions [10], then f(x) can only be a
random distribution function. If A is based on an adversary-orderingmodel, then
f(x) can be any distribution function. More interestingly, if A has no assumption
made on the arrival order of its inputs, we can utilise f(x) for other purpose. In
single-seller case, for example, we might push the ask to the front of the inputs
to guarantee a higher expected valuation of the selected trader and therefore to
further improve the efficiency of MA.
Figure 3 shows a running example of MA. MA first chooses a position for
each ask, then runs A on the merged input and selects the winners (indicated
by ‘*’), and finally determines the final asks and bids that are matched by using
the winners selected by A (traders allocated an item by MA are indicated by
circles). From the example in Figure 3, we can say that both the ask of value 2
and the bid of value 6 do not get item in the end, although they are selected by
A. That is, MA might improve the social welfare of the allocation given by A.
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Fig. 3: A Running Example of MA
5.2 Key Properties of MA
We will prove that the truthfulness and efficiency of MA directly follow that
of the one-sided auction A, and then show two instances of MA by utilizing
secretary-based online auctions.
Theorem 4. If A is truthful, then MA is truthful.
Proof. We will prove for sellers and buyers respectively. We need to show that
both sellers and buyers will reveal their true valuation, arrive and departure
truthfully, i.e. traders are incentivized to arrive as early as they can and depart
as late as possible.
For a buyer i of type θi that is not selected by A, θi will also not be matched
by MA. If i misreported θ′i and is selected by A, then v(θi) − pi ≤ 0, i.e. i will
get a negative (expected) utility in A, because A is truthful. Therefore, if θ′i is
matched by MA, then i’s utility v(θi)−max(pi, v(θj)) ≤ v(θi)− pi ≤ 0.
For a buyer i of type θi that is selected by A, θi will be either matched or
unmatched byMA depending on v(θi) and the lowest unmatched ask θj when θi
is selected. If v(θi) ≥ v(θj), θi is matched by MA. Otherwise, θi is unmatched.
If θi is matched by MA, then we know that i’s utility v(θi) − max(pi, v(θj))
is maximised, because v(θi) − pi is maximised by A and v(θj) is independent
of i and it is minimised if i arrives at his earliest arrival time. If θi is not
matched by MA, then we have pi ≤ v(θi) < v(θj). Since v(θj) is independent
of i and it is minimised if i arrives at his earliest arrival time, i can only be
matched by MA if i misreported θ′i such that v(θ′i) ≥ v(θj), but then his utility
v(θi)−max(pi, v(θj)) < 0.
We conclude from the above that buyers are incentivized to arrive at their
earliest arrival time and report their true valuation. Moreover,MA does not use
their departure time for decision-making, so the truthfulness of their departure
directly follows that of A.
For sellers, since we assume that all sellers are patient, i.e. sellers arriving
after the arrival of the first bid or departing before the last bid’s arrival are not
considered by MA, all sellers are incentivized to arrive/depart truthfully. The
following proves that sellers are also incentivized to reveal their true valuation.
For a matched seller i with ask θi, from the truthfulness of Mgreedy, we
know that the payment of MA also guarantees truthfulness for sellers, if the
bids selected by A are the same when i reported differently. However, the bids
selected by A might change if i reported a different valuation, so we need to
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check that the changes are not beneficial for i. Since A is truthful, the wining
probability for trader i with valuation report v′i > vi should be at least that with
valuation report vi in A (aka monotonicity). If i reported a higher valuation, she
might lower the winning probabilities of others/buyers. That is, the winning
probability of i with a higher valuation report in MA might be decreased and
also the payment will be potentially decreased. Thus, it is not beneficial for
i to misreport a higher valuation. If i misreported a lower valuation, then the
winning probability of others might be increased, and therefore, the bids selected
by A will have relatively lower valuations and more bids might be selected. Since
the number of agents A can select is fixed, by misreporting a lower valuation, i
increases the chance for lower-value buyers to get matched and receives a lower
pay. Thus, i reduces her chance to get matched with positive utility by reporting
a lower valuation. Similarly, we can check for unmatched sellers. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. If A is c-competitive, then MA is c-competitive.
Proof. Given report profile θ, let AA and BA be the sets of selected asks and
bids in A respectively. Since A is c-competitive for maximising social welfare, we
get W (A(θ)) = ∑θi∈AA∪BA v(θi) ≥ W (Opt(θ))c . Based on the winners AA ∪ BA
selected by A, MA will further improve the allocation. More specifically, an ask
selected (unselected) by A might sell (hold) the item in MA (e.g. the ask of
value 2 in Figure 3), while a bid selected by A might not be matched by MA if
the bid’s valuation is comparatively lower (e.g. the bid of value 6 in Figure 3).
The reason is that AA is only used to determine at least the |AA|-best sellers
will keep their items, and that some bids of BA are not matched byMA if their
valuations are not good enough. Thus, W (MA(θ)) ≥W (A(θ)) ≥ W (Opt(θ))c . ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let k be the number of sellers, there exists a truthful ODA MA
that is
– 2
√
e-competitive for k = 1.
– (1 + C√
k
)-competitive.
Corollary 1 follows the 2
√
e-competitive online single-item auction proposed
by Buchbinder et al. [11] via linear programming and the (1 + C√
k
)-competitive
online multi-item auction introduced by Kleinberg [10], which approaches to 1-
competitive as k approaches to∞. These two online one-sided auctions are based
on secretary problems, i.e. traders arrive randomly and therefore f(x) ofMA is
an uniform random distribution function in these instances.
It is worth mentioning that the reduction approach is also applicable if we
do not know how many buyers will arrive but that their arrival time satisfies
some distribution. In that case, we will assign an arrival time for each seller in
the reduction following that distribution.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the mechanism design problem of online double auction mar-
kets where traders are dynamically arriving and departing the markets. Due
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to the complexity of the dynamics brought by traders, we showed that there
is no deterministic and truthful online double auction that is competitive for
maximising social welfare in an adversarial model. However, this impossibility
does not apply to the situations where we can access certain prior information
of the participants. In this paper, we studied two environments where sellers
are relatively static and certain prior information of buyers is accessible. In the
first environment, we assumed that the demand (i.e. the number of buyers) is
not more than the supply (i.e. the number of sellers). Under this assumption,
we proposed a deterministic yet 2-competitive and truthful online mechanism
in Section 4. In the second environment, given the prior information that the
number of incoming buyers is predictable, we demonstrated in Section 5 how to
reduce a truthful online double auction to a truthful online one-sided auction,
and showed that the competitiveness of the reduced online double auction follows
that of the online one-sided auction. Especially, by using the reduction frame-
work, we found an online double auction that is almost 1-competitive. However,
the mechanisms proposed in this paper are not (weakly) budget balanced, which
is also an important factor besides truthfulness and efficiency and worth further
investigation, though it is often very hard to achieve all three criteria together
even in static cases [1,12]. In addition, there are many other online exchanges
are worth further investigation, e.g. electric vehicle charging [16] and kidney
exchange [17].
One might suspect that the “static” assumption made on sellers will limit the
applicability of these mechanisms. We argue that they can be applied in more
general settings where sellers can also arrive and depart at anytime. One way to
apply these mechanisms is running multiple instances of them in sequence. In
other words, we decompose an online market into multiple disjoint sub-markets
where the conditions fit the assumptions made here. For example, in some ex-
change markets, both sellers and buyers come and leave randomly, but one side,
e.g. sellers, stay longer than the other side. In that case, we can decompose the
market into many sub-markets running for a period of, say, one-month, i.e. there
will be 12 disjoint sub-markets for a one-year market. Each trader is allocated to
one/many sub-markets on his/her arrival, and the decomposition should guar-
antee that each seller is able to fully participate in at least one sub-market.
Under this decomposition, if the market is in a rising situation, then applying
the proposed auctions in each sub-market will achieve the same truthfulness and
competitiveness for the whole market (see the Appendix for more details).
We have seen that different prior knowledge gives us different advantages for
designing online mechanisms, as it reduces the dynamics in some extent. Espe-
cially, in very complex dynamic environments, without certain prior knowledge,
in general it is impossible to get ideal mechanisms. Therefore, one objective of
mechanism design in such complex environments is searching for desirable mech-
anisms by utilising as less prior knowledge as possible. Besides prior knowledge,
randomisation has also played an important role in this paper and other online
algorithm design [13,14,15].
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Appendix:
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We will prove the theorem for buyers and sellers respectively.
For buyers: Since the payment for matched buyers are non-decreasing over
time because of the valuation increasing of the lowest unmatched ask, the earlier
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the arrival time a buyer has, the higher probability to be matched and the lower
payment the buyer will get. Therefore, all buyers are incentivized to arrive at
their true/earliest arrival time. Since the mechanism does not use buyer’s de-
parture time for decision-making, there is no motivation for buyers to misreport
their departure time.
Regarding their valuation reporting, for a matched buyer i with bid θi, as-
sume m(θi) = θj , i.e. θi is matched to θj . i’s payment only depends on v(θj)
and v(θj) is independent of θi, so the payment of i cannot be changed by v(θi).
Moreover, increasing v(θi) does not change the probability for θi to be matched,
while decreasing v(θi) will reduce the probability for θi to be matched. For an
unmatched buyer i with bid θi, since θi cannot be matched to the currently best
unmatched ask on the arrival of θi or there is no unmatched ask left, i might be
able to increase his valuation to get matched, but then he has to pay more than
his valuation, i.e. i gets negative utility. Thus, reporting valuation truthfully
gives buyers the highest expected utility.
For sellers: All sellers are incentivized to arrive and depart truthfully as they
will not be considered if they arrive after the first buyer’s arrival or depart before
the last buyer’s arrival.
For a matched seller i with ask θi, we will show that i cannot report a different
valuation other than her true valuation to improve her payment. Let m be the
matching given by Best-first Allocation and θj = m(θi). Assume that θi and θj
is the i-th matched pair in m and |m| = k, i.e. the k-th matched pair of m is
θAlast and θ
B
last. The following proof is given on the condition whether or not θ
B
last
is reachable from θi.
(1) θBlast is reachable from θi (e.g. ask 2 in Figure 4a):
– If i reported θ′i instead of θi such that v(θ
′
i) > v(θi) and
v(θ′i) ≤ min(v(θ¯Amin),max(v(θBlast), v(θ¯Bmax))), the ranking position of θ′i is
i′ ≥ i and the allocation will give a new matching m′. For all i ≤ l < i′,
the l-th matched bid of m will be matched to (l + 1)-th matched ask of
m in m′, θ′i will be matched to i
′-th matched bid of m in m′, and for all
1 ≤ l < i and i′ < l ≤ k, the l-th matched pair of m is also a matched
pair in m′ (see Figure 4b and 4c for example). In both m and m′, the
payment for i is the same because θBlast is still reachable from θ
′
i, and θ¯
A
min,
θBlast and θ¯
B
max are not changed. Moreover, the probability for trader i to be
matched will be the same with both θi and θ
′
i, which is 1 here. However, if
v(θ′i) > min(v(θ¯
A
min),max(v(θ
B
last), v(θ¯
B
max))), then θ
′
i will not be matched in
m′ (see Figure 4d for example). Therefore, i cannot report a higher valuation
to receive more payment.
– If i reported θ′i instead of θi such that v(θ
′
i) < v(θi), we know that θ
′
i will be
matched. There will be two situations: 1) θBlast is still reachable from θ
′
i, 2)
θBlast is not reachable from θ
′
i. In the first situation, θ¯
A
min, θ
B
last and θ¯
B
max of
m and m′ are the same, so the payment will be the same for θ′i and θi. In the
second situation, we will have two sub-cases: a) θ¯Amin of m is θ
A
last of m
′ and
θ¯Bmax, θ
B
last are the same for both m and m
′ (see the manipulation example
in Figure 5c and 5a in another way around, i.e. ask of 4.5 is misreported as
Truthful and Competitive Online Double Auctions 17
ask of 2), b) θBlast of m is θ¯
B
max of m
′ and θ¯Amin is the same for both m and
m′ (see the manipulation example in Figure 5e and 5d (or Figure 5f and 5d)
in another way around). Following the proof for the condition “θBlast is not
reachable from θi” in the following, we conclude that i cannot improve her
utility by misreporting a lower valuation.
(2) θBlast is not reachable from θi (e.g. ask 2 in Figure 5a/5d):
– If i reported θ′i instead of θi such that v(θ
′
i) > v(θi) and
v(θ′i) ≤ max(v(θAlast), v(θ¯Bmax)), we will get a new matching m′. If θBlast is still
not reachable from θ′i in m
′, then the payment for θ′i is the same as for θi
(see Figure 5b for example). If θBlast of m is reachable from θ
′
i in m
′ and it is
also the last matched bid of m′ (i.e. v(θAlast) > v(θ¯
B
max)), then θ
A
last of m is
θ¯Amin of m
′ and therefore the payment for θ′i will be the same as for θi (e.g.
Figure 5a and 5c). If v(θAlast) ≤ v(θ¯Bmax) and θBlast of m′ is reachable from θ′i
in m′, then θBlast ofm
′ will be θ¯Bmax of m and θ
A
last of m
′ is either θAlast ofm or
θ′i (see Figure 5d, 5e and 5f for example). It is easy to check that the payment
in this case is also not improved. However, if v(θ′i) > max(v(θ
A
last), v(θ¯
B
max)),
then θ′i will not be matched in m
′. Therefore, i cannot improve her payment
by reporting a higher valuation.
– If i reported θ′i instead of θi such that v(θ
′
i) < v(θi), the ranking position
of θ′i might be lower than that of θi, but it will not change the probability
for i to be matched, θAlast and θ¯
B
max are still the same, and θ
B
last is still not
reachable from θ′i. Thus, the payment will be the same for i with both reports
θi and θ
′
i.
For an unmatched seller i with ask θi, we know that v(θ
A
last) ≤ v(θi) >
v(θ¯Bmax). If i reported θ
′
i such that v(θ
′
i) < v(θi) and θ
′
i is matched in the new
matching m′, then there will be three cases: (a) θAlast and θ
B
last of m are also
those of m′, (b) θAlast of m is θ¯
A
min of m
′ and θBlast of m is θ
B
last of m
′, (c) θ¯Bmax of
m is θBlast of m
′ and either θ′i or θ
A
last of m is θ
A
last of m
′. For any of these three
cases, the payment for i with report θ′i will be less than or equal to v(θi), i.e. i
gets non-positive utility by misreporting. ⊓⊔
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Fig. 4: Seller Manipulation Examples I
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Fig. 5: Seller Manipulation Examples II
An Extension to General Settings by Decomposing the Market
We have assumed that sellers are patient for the proposed mechanisms Mgreedy
andMA. We demonstrate in the following how to apply them in settings without
this assumption. We tackle the environment where both sellers and buyers arrive
and depart randomly and one side’s active time is relatively longer than the other
side. Without loose of generality, we assume that sellers stay longer in the market,
and each seller is active in the market for at least a period of length t. Assume
that the whole market runs for a length of time T . The following mechanism,
called EM, decomposes the whole online market into multiple sub-markets where
each sub-market runs a length of time t2 .
EM of M
1. Split the market into ⌈ 2T
t
⌉ sub-markets where each sub-market k ∈
{1, 2, ..., ⌈ 2T
t
⌉} runs in the period of [(k − 1) t2 ,min(k t2 , T )].
2. On the arrival of seller i, allocate i to the latest sub-market where she
is active during the whole running period of that sub-market.
3. On the arrival of buyer j, allocate j to all sub-markets where he can
active until he is matched.
4. Apply M in each sub-market.
Note that, on the arrival of a seller, she can only be allocated to a sub-market
where she is active over the whole running period of that sub-market, in order
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to apply the proposed mechanisms. That is, she cannot be allocated to a sub-
market where she arrives/departs during the sub-market is running. Also the
decomposition guarantees that each seller is able to fully active in at least one
sub-market.
Depending on the market situation, we will choose either Mgreedy or MA
to instantiate the above extension. If we know that the demand is not more
the supply in each sub-market, we can choose Mgreedy to get the extension
EMgreedy . If the number of incoming buyers is always predictable, we can apply
the reduction MA in the extension.
One interesting result we get from this extension is that when the market is
rising, we get the same truthfulness and competitiveness for EM as that of M.
We say a market is rising if the transaction prices are increasing, and in a good
economic situation, most markets are rising, e.g. real estate.
Theorem 6. Under a rising market situation, ifM is truthful and c-competitive,
then EM is truthful and c-competitive.
Proof (proof sketch). For truthfulness, we know that once a trader is allocated
to one sub-market, there is no beneficial manipulate in the sub-market because
of the truthfulness of M. Since the market is a rising market, so it is better for
a seller to sell her item as late as possible and for a buyer to buy the item as
early as possible, which is exactly what EM does.
For efficiency, earlier arrival sellers with relatively lower valuations have been
delayed for exchange as much as possible by EM so that they can be matched
to buyers with relatively higher valuations. ⊓⊔
It is worth mentioning that the above mechanism actually reflects one intu-
itive reasoning we have for trading in a rising market situation. More specifically,
in a rising market situation, a seller should sell her item as late as possible and
a buyer should buy the item as early as possible in order to gain higher profit.
Similarly, we can modify the above extension to fit for a falling/stable market
situation. Moreover, how this extension can be further generalized for other
market situations is worth further investigation.
